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In India, the out-of-pocket health expenditure by households accounts for around 70 percent 
of the total expenditure on health.  Large out-of-pocket payments may reduce consumption 
expenditure on other goods and services and push households into poverty.  Recently, health 
insurance has been considered as one of the possible instruments in reducing impoverishing 
effects of large out-of-pocket health expenditure.  In India, health insurance has limited 
coverage and the present paper studies whether it has been effective so far.  Literature 
defines out-of-pocket health expenditure as catastrophic if its share in the household budget 
is more than some arbitrary threshold level.  In the present paper, we argue that for 
households below poverty line any expenditure on health is catastrophic as they are unable to 
attain the subsistence level of consumption.  Thus, we take zero percent as a threshold level 
to define catastrophic health expenditure and examine the impact of health insurance on 
probability of incurring catastrophic health expenditure.   
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In India, around 70 percent of the total expenditure on health
2 is out-of-pocket (OOP) 
payments
3 by households (Government of India (GoI), 2005).  Other major sources of 
financing health care are the government, insurance, and external sources such as grants and 
loans from international organisations.  The share of the government in total health 
expenditure has remained low.  It has reduced marginally from 18.4 percent in 1998 to 17.9 
percent in 2001 (IIPS and WHO, 2006).  Further, as a part of the health sector reforms 
initiated in the early 1990s most of the Indian states have introduced user charges in public 
health facilities for patients belonging to families above poverty line
4.  Due to low share of 
government in total health care expenditure and introduction of user fees in public sector, 
households have to bear most of the expenses in the event of health shock, which may lead to 
a fall in consumption expenditure below subsistence level, i.e., to catastrophic OOP health 
expenditure.  Health insurance can provide financial protection to household in the event of 
health shock and can reduce catastrophic OOP expenditure on health care.  In India, health 
insurance coverage has been very low with only 1.6 percent of population covered in year 
2003
5.  Households have to depend on informal networks to make health care payments.  For 
example, in Hyderabad 24 percent of the households had to borrow to pay for health 
expenditure in 2006 (Banerjee and Duflo, 2007).  Recently, efforts have been made to 
increase insurance coverage particularly to poor households.  Policies to expand the insurance 
coverage can be formulated on a large scale if insurance proves to be important instrument to 
reduce catastrophic OOP payments.  However, knowledge about the effectiveness of medical 
insurance to reduce OOP expenditure is limited for India as few studies examine effect of 
insurance on household’s health expenditure.  Against this background, the present study 
aims to:  
                                                 
2 Total expenditure on health is defined as spending on care and treatment associated with illness, on 
administrative expenses associated with such treatment, spending on public health programmes, on medical 
research and training, rehabilitation, immunisation programmes and selected components of programme 
associated with maternal and child health. 
3 Out-of-pocket health payments refer to the payments made by households at the point they receive health care 
services.  Note that out-of-pocket payments are net of any insurance reimbursement.  (For further details see 
International Institute for Population Sciences (IIPS) and World Health Organisation (WHO) (2006)) 
4 See GoI (2007) 
5 See IIPS and WHO (2006)   4
1)  Examine factors that determine incidence and extent of catastrophic health expenditure by 
households and;  
2)  Study impact of health insurance on catastrophic health expenditure by households.   
There have been many studies, which address issues related to OOP expenditure.  Our study 
differs from the existing literature on OOP with reference to two major aspects: 
•  We examine the impact of health insurance on catastrophic OOP health expenditure for 
India.  Few studies have examined this.   
•  For the purpose of our study, we define catastrophic health expenditure as OOP payments 
on health care that exceed some fixed (threshold) proportion of total household 
expenditure.  In literature, this threshold level is normally defined as some arbitrary 
proportion of total household expenditure.  We argue that for households below the 
poverty line any spending on health care is a catastrophic health payment.  Thus, we take 
threshold limit to be zero.   
Results of our analysis point out poorer households as more vulnerable than their 
richer counterparts.  Poor households end up spending larger proportion of their total budget 
on health care.  Appropriate policies need to be formulated to reduce this financial burden of 
illness on poor.  Health insurance might be one of the instruments.  Our findings show that 
health insurance has negative and significant impact on probability of incurring catastrophic 
OOP health expenditure.  Our analysis shows that the probability of catastrophic OOP 
expenditure reduces by 10 percentage points due to medical insurance.  Further, insurance 
reduces the extent of catastrophic OOP expenditure in urban areas.  This has important policy 
implication as higher coverage of health insurance may bring down the monetary burden of 
health shocks on households.  Secondly, our results show that the extent of OOP health 
expenditure is lower for households where highest level of education completed by the 
economic head of the household is either primary or secondary level of education.  This 
finding brings out the importance of investing in elementary education to reduce household’s 
OOP expenditure on health care.  Our findings also show that usage of clean cooking fuels is 
an important determinant of catastrophic OOP payments by households.  Usage of clean 
cooking fuels reduces the share of OOP health spending in total household expenditure.   
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: the next section reviews the existing 
literature on issues related to OOP health care payments.  Section 3 provides information on 
data source.  Section 4 elaborates on the distribution of OOP expenditure for different income 
groups in six states of India.  Section 5 describes methodology and explanatory variables   5
used for our analysis.  Section 6 discusses the empirical findings.  Finally, section 7 
concludes.    
 
2. Literature Review: 
Large OOP expenditure on health may push household’s consumption expenditure below 
poverty line.  Various studies examine effect of OOP health expenditure on poverty head 
count and whether such expenses push households deeper into poverty.  Wagstaff and 
Doorslaer (2003) pioneered the minimum standard approach based on the concept of 
horizontal equity.  Many studies (for instance, Wagstaff and Doorslaer, 2003, Van Damme et 
al., 2004, Garg and Karan, 2005a, Schneider and Hanson, 2006, Markova, 2006, and 
Mendola et al., 2007) use this and other approaches such as concentration index to analyse 
distribution of financial burden due to OOP health expenditure and poverty impact of OOP 
health expenditure for different countries.  Findings of these studies call for policy measures 
to protect household’s consumption expenditure in the event of health shock.  For this 
purpose, it is important to analyse the determinants of health expenditure and provide some 
policy measures to reduce household’s OOP payments on health care.  Studies such as 
Sepehri et al. (2006), and Rous and Hotchkiss (2003) examine the determinants of health care 
spending by households.   
Sepehri et al. (2006) examines the impact of social health insurance in Vietnam on 
OOP expenditure using panel data for households to account for unobserved heterogeneity.  
This specification captures the effect of household level unobserved factors which are 
constant over time.  The study shows that insurance has negative and significant impact on 
OOP health expenditure.  Further, insurance is found to reduce OOP expenditure more for 
patients with lower incomes than for the patients with higher income.  Sepehri et al. (2006) 
examines the determinants of absolute level of health expenditure.  However, this analysis 
does not bring out the effect of OOP health expenditure on household’s consumption 
expenditure.  We incorporate this effect in our analysis by examining the share of OOP health 
expenditure in total household expenditure and provide some important policy implications 
for India.  Sepehri et al. (2006) considers economic access to health care, but ignores physical 
access.  Factors like availability of health care facilities and provider of health care (for 
instance, public vs. private) are important in determining household’s spending on health 
care.   
Rous and Hotchkiss (2003) accounts for choice of health care provider and addresses 
the issue of physical access to health care.  In particular, the paper takes into account the   6
effect of probability of getting ill and choice of health care provider on OOP health 
expenditure.  The study emphasises the importance of household income, demographic 
characteristics of the household head and residential setting of the household in determining 
spending on health care.  However, Rous and Hotchkiss (2003) like Sepehri et al. (2006) 
considers absolute health expenditure by households, and thus is unable to throw light on 
how OOP health expenditure affects consumption expenditure of households.  Some major 
studies examining the issues related to catastrophic OOP health expenditure, i.e., OOP 
expenditure that adversely affects consumption expenditure, are reviewed below. 
Cavagnero  et al. (2006) analyses determinants of health service utilisation and 
probability of incurring catastrophic OOP payments.  The paper brings out the importance of 
medical insurance in reducing the probability of catastrophic OOP health payments.  The 
results also show that presence of senior members, education of head of the household and 
income increase the probability of incurring catastrophic OOP health expenditure.  In this 
study, catastrophic OOP health expenditure is said to occur if OOP health expenditure 
exceeds 40 percent of capacity to pay (income after food consumption).  The limitation of 
this approach is that threshold level defining catastrophic OOP payments is set arbitrarily at 
40 percent.  Another limitation is that the paper does not extend the analysis to examine the 
determinants of extent of catastrophic OOP expenditure.   
Recently, various issues related to OOP expenditure on health have also been studied 
for India.  Gumber (2001), Garg and Karan (2005b) and O’Donnell et al. (2005) study OOP 
health spending using household level primary and secondary data.  Gumber (2001) uses 
primary survey in Gujarat to find the effect of micro health insurance provided by SEWA, a 
women’s union, on access to health care and OOP expenditure by estimating two-part model.  
The results of this study show that social insurance, care provider, and demographic 
characteristics of household are important determinants of OOP health expenditure.  The 
study is based on a purposive sample survey covering 1,200 households from Ahmedabad 
and neighbouring areas.  Thus, sample is not representative and results are valid only for the 
sample.  In our study, we use a representative sample survey, namely, World Health Survey, 
and aim to examine the impact of health insurance on catastrophic health care payments for 
six Indian states.   
Garg and Karan (2005b) and O’Donnell et al. (2005) examine the determinants of 
probability of incurring catastrophic OOP health expenditure and extent of catastrophic 
payments using two-part model.  While Garg and Karan (2005b) concentrates on India, 
O’Donnell et al. (2005) studies determinants of OOP expenditure for six Asian countries   7
including India.  For India, these studies use household level consumption expenditure data 
collected by the National Sample Survey Organisation for year 1999-2000.  The findings 
show that higher consumption expenditure is associated with higher probability of 
catastrophic OOP expenditure.  Inclusion of household’s total expenditure as one of the 
explanatory variables leads to endogeneity problem.  We use wealth index
6 to avoid the 
problem of endogeneity in our study.  Further, both the above-mentioned studies take OOP 
health expenditure higher than 10 percent of the total household expenditure as catastrophic 
OOP expenditure.  However, our argument is that an arbitrary 10 percent threshold limit to 
define catastrophe is too high for households below the poverty line.  Any expenditure on 
health is a catastrophe for the households who do not posses enough resources to secure even 
the subsistence level of consumption.  Thus, we take zero percent as a threshold for 
households below the poverty line
7.  Further, we also take threshold level as zero, the global 
minimum, for households above poverty line.  To the best of our knowledge, few studies 
have examined how insurance affects the probability and extent of catastrophic health 
spending for India.    
 
3. Data Source: 
The World Health Survey (WHS) was conducted in six states of India, namely, Assam, 
Karnataka, Maharashtra, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal during February to May 
2003.  States were selected with respect to their geographic location and level of development 
as measured by infant mortality rate, female literacy rate, percentage of safe delivery and per 
capita state domestic product.  All Indian states with population five million and above, 
except for Jammu and Kashmir, were divided into six geographical regions and six levels of 
development.  Then the states were chosen in such a manner that one state is selected from 
each region and from each level of development category (IIPS and WHO, 2006)
8.  
Therefore, this sample can be broadly taken as representative of India.   
A total of 10,750 households were covered under the survey from the six states of 
India.  A two stage stratified sampling was used for the selection of households in rural areas.  
The villages were the primary sampling units (PSU).  Households were selected from these 
villages at the second stage.  In urban areas, a three-stage design was used with the selection 
                                                 
6 Refer Section 5.1 for detailed description of wealth index and its construction. 
7 In our data set, 26 percent of the households are below poverty line.  Here, poverty line is defined as the 
household food expenditure whose food share of total household spending is at the median of the country (IIPS 
and WHO, 2006) 
8 For more details on selection of states see IIPS (2006)   8
of wards, census enumeration blocks and households in that order.  An adult member of the 
household in the age 18 and above was randomly selected from household roster using KISH 
grid tables for answering the individual questionnaire modules on health.  We have combined 
the information collected from household and individual questionnaire for our study.   
The World Health Survey, conducted in 2003, collected information on various topics 
related to health including health expenditure, health insurance, risk factors, and health status.  
Some of these variables are reported at household level while others at individual level.  In 
our study, the unit of measurement is a household.  Thus, we construct variables at household 
level from the information available at individual level.  For example, health insurance status 
is reported at the individual level.  From this information we have created two different 
dummies.  The first dummy is defined to separate households with at least one insured 
member from the rest, whereas the second one is to distinguish households with insured 
economic head from the rest of the households.   
Further, note that information on environmental risk factors is obtained from 
individual questionnaire.  We can use this information for the study at household level.  For 
example, the information regarding availability of safe drinking water or sanitation is likely 
to be same for all the household members.   
Major limitation of the data is that information on health costs of insured member is 
not given separately.  Thus, we can only see the impact of insurance status at household level.   
 
4. Descriptive Statistics: 
The average monthly OOP spending on health is Rs. 116 and the average proportion of total 
household expenditure on health care is 12.48 percent for India.  However, these averages do 
not bring out the entire story and thus, we look at the ordered distribution of share of OOP 
health expenditure.  The ordered distribution of share of OOP health expenditure is depicted 
using box plot diagrams (Figure 1 to Figure 4) across wealth index quintiles, insurance status, 
rural-urban sectors, and six Indian states.  Note that the distribution of share of OOP 
expenditure is positively skewed in all the cases.  In such a situation, median is a better 
measure of central tendency than mean.  Median share of health expenditure is lower for 
higher wealth index quintiles.  Similarly, for the households with at least one insured member 
and households residing in urban areas median share on OOP health expenditure is lower.  
Consistent with these results, richer state Karnataka shows lower median share of OOP 
expenditure than states of Rajasthan and Utter Pradesh.  Interestingly, Maharashtra shows 
higher median share of OOP expenditure on health in spite of being a richer state.  This fact   9
might be explained by higher morbidity rates in Maharashtra than in Karnataka and Rajasthan 
in the year 2004 (GoI, 2006).   
Moreover, these box plot diagrams consistently suggest that the inter-quartile range 
(IQR) for relatively affluent sections is smaller than their poorer counterparts.  The ordered 
distribution of share of OOP expenditure has the highest IQR for the first wealth index 
quintile (see Table 3).  This IQR declines gradually with wealth index and becomes the 
lowest IQR for the fifth wealth index quintile.  Further, the Bowley’s measure of skewness
9 
shows that skewness of share of OOP expenditure is the highest for the first wealth index 
quintile.  This result means that median is closer to first quartile and large proportion of 
households from first wealth index quintile allocates lower share for OOP health expenditure.  
Similarly, IQR is the smallest in the case of relatively affluent regions such as urban areas 
and the states of Maharashtra and Karnataka
10.  The IQR of share of OOP health expenditure 
is also lower for households with at least one insured member as against those households 
without any insured member.  For insured households skewness of ordered distribution of 
OOP expenditure share is lower than that for uninsured households.  A plausible explanation 
for these results is that the poorer households ignore minor health shocks and spend lower 
(negligible) proportion on health care due to lack of resources.  However, in case of severe 
health shock, they have little choice but to spend large amount on health care, which forms 
huge proportion of their entire household budget.  On the other hand, richer households can 
attend minor health shocks.  Further, even if severe health shocks demand large amount of 
spending in absolute terms, it accounts for relatively smaller proportion of total budget of rich 
household.  As a result, IQR of share of OOP expenditure is higher in case of poorer 
households than richer households.   
This section shows that relatively poor households are affected in case of severe 
health shocks.  Apart from income, other factors such as regional factors and insurance status 
affect share of total budget spent on OOP health expenditure.  In the next section, we analyse 





                                                 
9 Bowley’s measure of skewness is based on quartiles and thus is a robust estimate of skewness in case of 
skewed distribution.   
10 Assam shows the lowest IQR amongst all six states.  This result is hard to explain.   10
5. Empirical Methodology: 
We examine the determinants of incidence and extent of catastrophic OOP health care 
expenditure.  Studies (for instance Wagstaff, 2003, O’Donnell et al., 2005, Garg and Karan, 
2005a, Mendola et al., 2007) define catastrophic OOP health expenditure as OOP 
expenditure on health, which exceeds some threshold percentage of total household 
expenditure.  However, most of the studies arbitrarily set the threshold limit.  Our argument is 
that for households below poverty line any expenditure on health care is catastrophic since 
these households are unable to meet the subsistence consumption.  As a result we take zero 
percent as threshold limit to define catastrophic OOP health expenditure.  For the households 
above the poverty line, threshold limit should vary with income.  However, for the present 
study we have taken threshold limit to be zero, the global minimum, for all the households. 
We use two-part model
11 to estimate the probability of incurring catastrophic OOP 
health expenditure and extent of such spending given that household has spent on health care 
more than the threshold limit.  The probability of incurring health expenditure/ catastrophic 
health expenditure is modeled
12 as follows:  
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where hi represents the event of incurring catastrophic health expenditure, xi is a 
vector of various explanatory variables and  i ε  is random error term.   
The second part models extent of catastrophic health expenditure.  For this purpose, 
only the households with health spending more than the threshold limit are considered.  Note 
that, in this case our dependent variable is a proportion.  Thus, dependent variable is bounded 
between zero and one.  Further, in our data set the dependent variable does not take on the 
boundary values
















                                                 
11 Heckman’s sample selection model is another alternative used in the literature.  It is useful when we want to 
examine potential health expenditure rather than the actual (Duan, et al., 1984).  We also carry out our analysis 
using Heckman’s sample selection model and find that the inverse mills ratio was insignificant.  Heckman’s 
sample selection model also gives similar results. 
12 We also carried out probit specification for estimating probability of catastrophic OOP payments and found 
the similar results.  In particular, the sign and significance of the explanatory variables do not change.  
13 Papke and Wooldridge (1996) proposed the generalised linear models (GLM) to estimate the parameters with 
fractional dependent variable, which takes on the boundary values.     11
OR 
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where yi is health expenditure expressed as proportion of total household expenditure, xi is a 
vector of explanatory variables and εi is random error term.   
We estimate the model with and without sampling weights.  As mentioned in the third 
section, survey uses stratified sampling with different probabilities for each household.  As a 
result, in order to obtain unbiased estimates of coefficients we have used sampling weights 
(see Deaton, 1997 for details).     
 
5.1. Variable Description: 
In this subsection we will describe the explanatory variables that are considered while 
modeling the incidence and extent of catastrophic OOP health expenditure.  We have 
categorised the variables into four groups, namely, economic variables, health risk factors, 
demographic variables and regional variables.   
 
Economic Variables: 
Among other factors, OOP health expenditure is determined by household’s income.  
Household with higher income have resources to allocate towards health care.  On the other 
hand, households below poverty line are unable to meet even their subsistence consumption 
expenditure.  These households do not have enough resources to incur any type of health care 
spending.  Further, for rich households health expenditure is expected to account for lower 
share than for poor households.  We use wealth index
14, constructed from twenty permanent 
income indicators, to analyse the impact of income on incidence and extent of catastrophic 
health spending.  These twenty assets include number of rooms in the house, chairs, tables, 
cars, electricity, bicycle, clock, bucker, washing machine for dishes, washing machine for 
clothes, refrigerator, telephone, mobile/cellular telephone, television, computer, 
moped/scooter/motorcycle, livestock, sewing machine, radio/transitor/tape-recorder and 
bullock cart.  For the purpose of constructing wealth index we use the method of principle 
components as explained in Filmer and Pritchett (2001).  The permanent wealth index also 
                                                 
14 In our data set the correlation between wealth index and household’s consumption expenditure is negative.  
This puzzling result may be due to lack of precision in measuring consumption expenditure.  Since our data set 
categorise consumption expenditure only in six heads, there might be problem while recollecting the amount 
correctly due to aggregation.     12
captures household’s capacity to finance OOP health expenditure through borrowing and 
selling assets.  Literature uses per capita consumption expenditure to find out the effect of 
income on health care spending (for example, Gumber, 2001, O’Donnell et al., 2005, Rous 
and Hotchkiss, 2003 and Sepehri et al., 2006).  However, O’Donnell et al. (2005) points out 
that consumption expenditure can be endogenous.  Since wealth index does not include health 
expenditure, the problem of endogeneity is avoided.   
Income may limit household’s access to health care, whereas insurance may guarantee 
higher access to health care as reimbursements from insurance company reduce the OOP 
health expenditure.  On the other hand, insurance may lead to moral hazard problem and 
individual having insurance may not have incentive to take care of their health and invest in 
the preventive care.  At the same time, health insurance might increase economic access to 
better and expensive health care.  This may increase the probability of getting ill and thus 
expenditure on health will be higher.  As a result, net effect of health insurance is ambiguous 
in theory.  We study the impact of health insurance through two specifications.  First 
specification includes a dummy for insurance status of the economic head of the household
15.  
To check the robustness of this aggregation, in the second specification we consider a dummy 
for households with at least one insured member.  Moreover, it is possible that the insurance 
status affects households in different income groups differently.  In order to capture this 
possible effect, we include interaction term between wealth index and insurance status.   
Another important variable that might affect OOP expenditure is education.   
Literature points out three reasons to explain the relation between education and health, 
namely, efficiency mechanisms, unobserved heterogeneity and future opportunity cost 
(Cowell, 2006).  The Grossman’s model states that individual produces health in order to 
optimise his intertemporal budget constraint.  In this formulation, education comes as one of 
the inputs in the production function of health and education increases the productive and 
allocative efficiency of individual (Grossman, 1999 and Cowell, 2006).  Higher education 
means that person will be able to produce more health with higher education for given level 
of health care expenditure.   
The future opportunity cost relates education to health through forgone wages due to 
illness.  Higher education is generally associated with higher wages and thus in order to 
reduce opportunity cost of health shock household would invest more in preventive health 
                                                 
15 Economic head of the household is a member of the household who provides main economic support (see 
IIPS and WHO 2006).   13
care.  We include education of the economic head of the household to examine the impact of 
education on health expenditure by household.   
 
Environmental Risk Factors: 
Access to clean drinking water, sanitation facilities, and other environmental factors 
are likely to influence health risks to which the household is exposed.  For instance, Karn et 
al. (2003) finds that in the slums of Mumbai, incidence of water-related diseases is much less 
in the households with higher consumption of water and better housing conditions.  Apart 
from sanitation and drinking water, air pollution inside house also has adverse impact on 
health status.  Long-term exposure to solid cooking fuels increases the chances of falling ill 
(Parikh et al., 2003).  The extent of exposure to health risk in turn determines the level of 
health expenditure.  Thus, we include dummies for access to piped water, hygienic toilet 
facilities and clean cooking fuels to account for such environmental risk factors
16.   
 
Demographic Variables: 
Composition of household may affect the health expenditure.  For example, children 
or elderly persons are more vulnerable to health risks and thus households with more number 
of children and elderly persons may have to spend more on health care.  According to 
Grossman’s model of health capital, health depreciates over the period and the depreciation 
rate increases with age.  As a result, higher OOP expenditure on health care might be required 
at old age (see Grossman, 1972; Zweifel and Breyer, 1997).  Further, we also expect 
household size to increase health expenditure, as there is more chance that a household 
member gets sick.  On the contrary, larger household size may reduce the health care 
spending due to higher amount of care can be provided at home.   
Further, social status might influence OOP health expenditure.  In order to capture 
this factor, we include religion of household head as one of the regressors.  Gender and age of 
the household head also influences the probability of incurring catastrophic OOP health 
expenditure.  Female-headed households have higher chance of facing catastrophic OOP 
expenditure (Cavagnero et al., 2006).  Thus, we include these two variables as regressors in 
our model.     
 
 
                                                 
16 See Table 1 for the detailed description of explanatory variables.   14
Regional Variables: 
One would expect health care spending to differ across rural and urban sectors.  Thus, 
we include dummy variable for urban sector.  Further, we have included state dummies to 
control for health determinants at state level.   
 
6. Results: 
Our results show that presence of insurance, wealth index, education of head of the 
household, household size, number of children and elderly persons in the household and 
usage of clean cooking fuels are important determinants of catastrophic health expenditure.  
Households with lower wealth index spend larger proportion of their total budget on health 
care.  This result depicts that the poorer households are more vulnerable and policies have to 
be formulated to reduce this economic burden on poorer households.  Further, our results 
suggest that increasing insurance coverage may prove to be important instrument for extent 
(urban sector) of catastrophic OOP expenditure.  Similarly, education might act as an 
instrument to reduce the probability of incurring catastrophic health expenditure through 
reducing chance of getting ill.  At the same time, access to clean cooking fuels might also 
reduce risk of falling ill and thus in turn reduce expenditure on health care.  In the remaining 
part of this section we will discuss the effect of various explanatory variables on catastrophic 
health expenditure in detail.   
 
6.1. Results from Two-Part Model: 
Economic Variables: 
Our findings suggest that index of permanent income of the household does not affect 
the probability of catastrophic OOP health expenditure.  However, wealth index does have 
negative and significant impact on the extent of health care spending
17.  Our results contradict 
findings of O’Donnell et al. (2005) that report positive impact of consumption expenditure on 
incidence and extent of OOP expenditure.  The fact that consumption expenditure includes 
health expenditure explains this difference in the results.  Further, note that proportion 
allocated to OOP health expenditure reduces with permanent income of the household.  This 
suggests that rich households have large resources and thus OOP expenditure constitutes 
smaller fraction in their total budget as compared to poor households.  These findings point 
                                                 
17 We also carry out the same analysis with two different thresholds for OOP health expenditure, five percent 
and ten percent of total household expenditure.  Our results do not change with the change in threshold level.     15
out that the poorer households are vulnerable and it is essential to formulate appropriate 
policies to protect them from financial risk associated with illness. 
As mentioned in the previous section we examine the effect of health insurance on 
OOP expenditure with two distinct specifications.  One specification is with a dummy for 
households where economic head has health insurance and the other is with a dummy 
variable for households with at least one member having health insurance.  In both the 
specifications, households with medical insurance have lower probability of incurring 
catastrophic health expenditure as compared to those without insurance
18.  Furthermore, 
interaction term between insurance and wealth index has positive sign suggesting that this 
effect is stronger for households in lower income group.  Thus, our results suggest that 
insurance can be tried out as an instrument to reduce the monetary burden of OOP 
expenditure on households
19.  However, this result should be interpreted with a caution.   
Insurance can reduce the probability of incurring health expenditure either if there is total 
reimbursement or the probability of getting ill for households with insurance is lower than 
those without insurance.  In the first situation, insurance will prove to be an important 
instrument to reduce probability of incurring OOP health expenditure.   
Education of head of the household is another important factor in determining the 
extent of health expenditure.  If head of the household has completed either primary or 
secondary school, then household allocates less proportion of expenditure to health care as 
compared to the households where head does not have any formal schooling (in the first 
specification).  Thus, education can reduce proportion of share of OOP expenditure in 
household’s budget.   
 
Environmental Risk Factors: 
Only one out of three explanatory variables capturing environmental risks, namely, 
usage of clean cooking fuels significantly affects OOP expenditure.  Using clean cooking 
fuels such as kerosene and LPG reduces proportion of health expenditure in total household 
expenditure.  This result suggests that improvement in environmental factors can be effective 
in reducing health payments by households.   
                                                 
18 Our results do not change if we take five percent as threshold level.  However, for 10 percent threshold limit, 
health insurance has significant negative impact on OOP health expenditure but does not affect the probability 
of incurring catastrophic OOP expenditure.  Thus, our results remain same qualitatively. 
19 Benefits from insurance might also depend on knowledge regarding existence of insurance and process of 
obtaining reimbursement.  To examine the joint effect of insurance and education on health expenditure we 
include interaction terms in our specification.  However, we do not find any significant impact of these 
interaction terms either on probability or on magnitude of catastrophic health spending.     16
 
Demographic Variables: 
Household size and number of children in household increase the probability of 
catastrophic OOP health expenditure
20.  Studies such as O’Donnell et al. (2005) and 
Cavagnero et al. (2006) point out that the age composition of the household might have an 
impact on OOP health expenditure.  Results of our study show that number of children and 
elderly persons increase the share of OOP expenditure in total household expenditure.  As 
mentioned earlier, children and elderly persons are more vulnerable to health risks.  As a 
result, households with more children and elderly persons end up spending larger share on 
health care.   
 
Regional Variables: 
Health facilities differ across regions and states and thus OOP health expenditure is 
also likely to differ across states.  Our study points out that households belonging to urban 
areas spend lower proportion of total household expenditure on health care in comparison to 
rural households.  Further, most of the state dummies are significant reflecting wide variation 
in probability of incurring health expenditure and its share in total expenditure across states.   
 
6.2. Predicted Probabilities: 
In this sub-section, we examine how different explanatory variables affect the 
predicted probabilities of catastrophic OOP expenditure
21.  We take a base household 
belonging to first wealth quintile, without insurance, having clean sanitation and drinking 
water facilities, without any child or aged person in the house, with female, uneducated head, 
belonging to Hindu religion and staying in rural area of Karnataka
22.  We change these 
attributes sequentially to examine the impact of different attributes on probability of 
catastrophic health care payments by household.   
The probability of catastrophic OOP health expenditure for the base household is 61 
percent (see Table 6).  Households with one child and one aged person are more vulnerable 
                                                 
20 Household size increases the probability of catastrophic OOP health expenditure when we change the 
threshold limit to five percent, however does not have any significant impact when threshold level is ten percent 
of the total household expenditure.  Further, number of elderly persons also increases the probability of 
catastrophic OOP expenditure, when threshold limit is taken as either five or ten percent of total household 
expenditure.   
21 To compare the probabilities for different wealth classes, we take five quintiles of wealth index and re-
estimate the model. 
22 Household size and age of household head is set at the mean level.   17
and the probability increases to 65 percent for such households.  If head of the household is a 
male member then the probability is lower at 63 percent.  Note that if head of the household 
has health insurance then it reduces the chance of paying catastrophically on health care to 51 
percent.  Thus, insurance reduces the probability of incurring catastrophic OOP expenditure 
on health care by 10 percent.  This result indicates that it might worth the while to extend 
insurance coverage for vulnerable households (e.g. households with children and aged 
persons and female-headed households) to reduce the probability of catastrophic OOP 
expenditure on health.  Further, note that probability of catastrophic OOP payments changes 
drastically across states.  For example, if the same base household were to reside in the state 
of Maharashtra instead of Karnataka, then its probability of catastrophic payments increases 
drastically to 85 percent.  One possible explanation of differences in probability of 
catastrophic OOP payments may be the differences in utilisation of health care facilities 
across states.  Probability of spending on health care services is affected by the utilisation of 
health care services.  If the ailing person does not receive any medical treatment then there 
will not be any spending on health care.  Thus, the variation in utilisation might explain the 
variation in predicted probabilities of incurring catastrophic OOP payments on health care.  
Table 7 shows the percentage of untreated ailments for each of the six states.  It is evident 
that in Maharashtra only 10.3 percent and 8.6 percent ailments are untreated in rural and 
urban areas respectively.  On the other hand, the figures stand at 23.6 percent and 13.3 
percent for the state of Karnataka.  Lower probability of incurring OOP payments on health 
care services in Karnataka might be explained by high percentage of untreated ailments.  This 
shows that it is required to first identify the areas where households are more likely to incur 
catastrophic health care expenditure and then target such areas to extend health insurance.   
 
6.3. Results from Separate Specifications for Urban and Rural Sectors: 
The determinants of catastrophic OOP health expenditure might vary across urban 
and rural sectors.  In order to examine these sectoral differences, we carry out our analysis 
separately for the two above-mentioned sectors
23.  Interestingly, results show that insurance 
has significant negative impact on probability of incurring catastrophic OOP expenditure 
only in rural sector (Table A.1).  However, in urban sector presence of insurance significantly 
reduces the extent of catastrophic OOP expenditure (Table A.2).  Secondly, availability of 
clean toilets reduces the probability and extent of catastrophic OOP health expenditure 
                                                 
23 For this purpose, we construct the wealth index separately for urban and rural sectors, as weights of assets are 
likely to be different for two sectors.   18
significantly in urban sector.  Effect of education on OOP health expenditure is visible only 
in rural sector where it reduces the extent of catastrophic OOP payments.  Even though there 
are sectoral differences, presence of insurance remains to be an important determinant of 
probability and extent of catastrophic OOP payments. 
 
7. Conclusion: 
Our paper examines the determinants of probability and magnitude of catastrophic OOP 
health expenditure.  We examine the impact of health insurance on catastrophic health 
expenditure.  This issue has received little attention in the past.  We argue that any positive 
health expenditure is a catastrophe for poor households and thus set the threshold limit at zero 
percent.   
Our results show that the poorer households are more vulnerable and have to spend 
larger proportion of their total budget on health care than the richer households.  These 
findings point out the need to formulate the policy to financially protect poorer households 
from health shocks and reduce the economic burden of illness.  Further, households with 
children and elderly persons are more vulnerable.  Identifying vulnerable groups and 
formulating appropriate policies, such as expanding insurance coverage, is required to reduce 
the economic burden of health shocks.   
Findings of our analysis show that the probability of catastrophic OOP expenditure 
reduces by 10 percent if the head of the household has medical insurance.  Also, our findings 
also show that insurance reduces the extent of total budget allocated towards OOP health 
expenditure in urban areas.  This result has important policy implication particularly when the 
government is introducing user fees in public sector and government’s share in total health 
expenditure is reducing.  Increased insurance coverage may protect households from 
catastrophic health expenditure without increasing public expenditure on health.  However, 
further examination in this matter is required as the insurance coverage increases from its 
present negligible level.   
Apart from insurance other factors such as education and usage of clean cooking fuels 
may act as an instrument to reduce financial burden of health shocks on households.  Primary 
and secondary level of education reduces the catastrophic OOP health expenditure.  However, 
the gains of education are not visible at higher levels of schooling.  Thus, increasing the 
coverage of elementary and secondary education might help to decrease the health 
expenditure.  Increasing the coverage of clean cooking fuels also might reduce health care 
spending by households.     19
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Table 1: Description of Explanatory Variables 
Variable  Variable Definition 
Economic Variables   
Wealth Index  Index created using information on twenty questions regarding 
assets held by the household 
Medical Insurance  = 1 if at least one member of the household is covered with 
health insurance; = 0 otherwise 
Insurance_Head  = 1 if economic head of the household is covered with health 
insurance; = 0 otherwise 
Interaction between 
Wealth Index and 
Insurance 
 
Primary  = 1 if household head has completed primary education ; = 0 
otherwise 
Secondary  = 1 if household head has completed secondary education; = 0 
otherwise 
Highschool  = 1 if household head has completed high school or any above 
level of education; = 0 otherwise 
Health Risk Factors   
Toilet  = 1 if the household has hygienic toilet facilities; = 0 otherwise 
Drinking Water  = 1 if the main source of drinking water is piped water; = 0 
otherwise 
Cooking Fuel  = 1 if the household uses gas, electricity or kerosene for 
cooking; = 0 otherwise 
Demographic Variables   
Muslim  = 1 if household member belongs to Muslim community; = 0 
otherwise 
Other  = 1 if household member belongs to Other communities; = 0 
otherwise (Hindu community is taken as base category) 
HHsize Household  size 
Child  Number of children (below 5 yrs of age) in the household 
Aged  Number of elderly persons (above 65 yrs of age) in the 
household 
Age_head  Age of household head 
Gender_head  = 1 if household head is male; = 0 otherwise 
Regional Variables   
Urban  = 1 if household resides in urban area; = 0 otherwise 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of Explanatory Variables 
Varaible Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Economic Variables      
Wealth Index  5.58e-11  2.216  -3.123  11.429 
Medical Insurance  0.037  0.188  0  1 
Insurance_Head 0.036  0.187  0 1 
Insurance_HH 0.014  0.118  0  1 
Primary 0.134  0.340  0  1 
Secondary 0.153  0.360  0  1 
Highschool 0.926  0.261  0  1 
Health Risk Factors      
Toilet 0.225  0.418  0  1 
Drinking Water  0.302  0.459  0  1 
Cooking Fuel  0.288  0.453  0  1 
Demographic Variables      
Muslim 0.118  0.322  0  1 
Other 0.074  0.262  0  1 
HHsize 0.266  0.442  0  1 
Child  0.633 0.922  0  6 
Aged  0.631 0.710  0  4 
Age_head 45.837  13.987  1  110 
Sex_head 0.926  0.261  0  1 
Regional Variables      
Urban 0.279  0.449  0  1 
Source: World Health Survey, 2003 and Author’s Calculations. 
 
 
Table 3: Distribution of Proportion of OOP Health Expenditure 
 Q1  Q2  Q3 
Bowley's 
Skewness IQR 
Wealth Index Quintiles 
First  Quintile  0.000 0.082 0.232 0.296 0.232 
Second  Quintile  0.000 0.083 0.199 0.163 0.199 
Third  Quintile 0.000 0.067 0.175 0.234 0.175 
Fourth  Quintile  0.003 0.073 0.170 0.160 0.166 
Fifth  Quintile 0.011 0.066 0.147 0.192 0.136 
Rural/Urban Sector 
urban    0.012 0.055 0.128 0.259 0.116 
Rural  0.000 0.081 0.200 0.187 0.200 
Insurance  Status       
insured  0.000 0.061 0.143 0.152 0.143 
uninsured  0.000 0.077 0.194 0.205 0.194 
States       
Assam  0.000 0.055 0.134 0.183 0.134 
Karnataka  0.000 0.067 0.167 0.200 0.167 
Maharashtra  0.029 0.083 0.182 0.289 0.153 
Rajasthan  0.000 0.087 0.219 0.208 0.219 
Uttar  Pradesh 0.000 0.077 0.213 0.277 0.213 
West  Bengal  0.004 0.071 0.187 0.262 0.183 
Source: World Health Survey, 2003 and Author’s Calculations. 
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Table 4: Determinants of Probability of Catastrophic Health Expenditure 
Variable Coefficient  dy/dx  p-value Coefficient  dy/dx  p-value 
Economic Variables        
Wealth  Index  0.015 0.003 0.596 0.026 0.005 0.329 
Insurance_head -0.796  -0.175  0.000       
Interaction (Wealth & 
Insurance head)  0.401  0.076  0.000       
Medical Insurance        -0.656  -0.141  0.002 
Interaction (Wealth & 
Med insurance)        0.352  0.067  0.000 
Primary  0.097 0.018 0.327 0.099 0.019 0.282 
Secondary  0.154 0.028 0.253 0.143 0.026 0.251 
Highschool  0.063 0.012 0.637 0.064 0.012 0.607 
Health Risk Factors        
Toilet  -0.152 -0.030 0.328 -0.076 -0.015 0.583 
Drinking  Water  0.112 0.021 0.289 0.163 0.030 0.100 
Cooking Fuel  0.019  0.003  0.896  0.001  1.5E-04  0.995 
Demographic Variables        
Muslim  0.027 0.005 0.817 -0.024 -0.005 0.827 
Other  -0.071 -0.014 0.625 -0.026 -0.005 0.850 
HHsize  0.083 0.016 0.000 0.077 0.015 0.000 
Child  0.095 0.018 0.075 0.086 0.016 0.083 
Aged  0.077 0.015 0.228 0.048 0.009 0.414 
Age_head  0.001 1.7E-04 0.784  0.001 1.9E-04 0.729 
Sex_head  -0.111 -0.021 0.516 -0.073 -0.014 0.635 
Regional Variables        
Urban  0.139 0.026 0.177 0.068 0.013 0.486 
Constant  0.118  0.651  0.058  0.806 
        
Observations  6603     7338    
Log  Pseudo-likelihood  -3661.91     -4085.52    
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Table 5: Determinants of Extent of Catastrophic Health Expenditure 
(Dependent variable is after logistic transformation) 
Variable Coefficient  p-value Coefficient p-value 
Economic Variables      
Wealth  Index  -0.045 0.008 -0.051 0.002 
Insurance_head -0.221  0.152     
Interaction (Wealth & Insurance head)  0.045  0.362     
Medical Insurance      -0.131  0.344 
Interaction (Wealth & Med insurance)      0.050  0.248 
Primary  -0.133 0.050 -0.064 0.322 
Secondary  -0.190 0.059 -0.117 0.224 
Highschool  -0.008 0.946 -0.021 0.850 
Health Risk Factors      
Toilet  -0.113 0.290 -0.153 0.115 
Drinking Water  4.2E-04  0.995  -0.021  0.737 
Cooking  Fuel  -0.195 0.044 -0.189 0.042 
Demographic Variables      
Muslim  0.112 0.169 0.107 0.177 
Other  0.177 0.053 0.156 0.072 
HHsize  -0.018 0.170 -0.020 0.100 
Child  0.106 0.001 0.107 0.000 
Aged  0.218 0.000 0.195 0.000 
Age_head  -0.004 0.067 -0.002 0.224 
Sex_head  -0.114 0.273 -0.101 0.259 
Regional Variables      
Urban  -0.205 0.002 -0.202 0.002 
Constant  -1.901 0.000 -1.965 0.000 
      
Observations  4810  5321  
R-squared  0.068  0.067  
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Table 6: Predicted Probabilities of Catastrophic Health Care Spending 
Specification Predicted  Probability 
Base  0.610 
Maharashtra 0.846 
Presence of child and aged  0.651 
Presence of child and aged, and male head  0.627 
Presence of child and aged, and male head and insurance  0.513 
Presence of child and aged, and male head, insurance and urban sector  0.553 
Presence of child and aged, and male head, insurance, urban sector 
and belonging to third wealth class  0.538 
Presence of child and aged, and male head, insurance, urban sector, 
belonging to third wealth class and residing in Maharashtra  0.803 
Source: World Health Survey, 2003 and Author’s Calculations. 
 
 
Table 7: Percentage of Untreated Ailments 
State  Untreated Ailments Out of Total Ailments (%) 
 Rural  Urban 
Assam 19.8  10.6 
Karnataka 23.6  13.3 
Maharashtra 10.3  8.6 
Rajasthan 11.2  7.4 
Uttar Pradesh  21.1  13.1 
West Bengal  20.2  15.4 
Source: NSSO 60































First Quintile Second Quintile Third Quintile Fourth Quintile Fifth Quintile
Fig. 1: Distribution of Share of OOP Expenditure by Wealth Index Quintiles
 






























Fig. 2: Distribution of Share of OOP Expenditure by Insurance Status
 































Fig. 3: Distribution of Share of OOP Expenditure by Rural/Urban Sectors
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on World Health Survey – 2003, India. 





























Assam Karnataka Maharashtra Rajasthan Uttar Pradesh West Bengal
Fig. 4: Distribution of Share of OOP Expenditure by States
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on World Health Survey – 2003, India. 
 
 
Table A.1: Determinants of Probability of Catastrophic Health Expenditure for Urban 
and Rural Sectors 
 Urban  Rural 
Variable Coefficient  dy/dx  p-value Coefficient  dy/dx  p-value 
Economic Variables          
Wealth  Index  -0.069  -0.010  0.084 0.016 0.003  0.583 
Insurance_head -0.250  -0.040  0.379  -1.013  -0.231  0.000 
Interaction (Wealth & 
Insurance  head)  0.528 0.078  0.000 0.325 0.063  0.028 
Primary  -0.253  -0.039  0.167 0.119 0.023  0.263 
Secondary  -0.120  -0.018  0.562 0.173 0.032  0.260 
Highschool  0.067 0.010  0.753 0.039 0.008  0.794 
Health Risk Factors          
Toilet  -0.872  -0.128  0.000 0.016 0.003  0.938 
Drinking  Water  0.145 0.022  0.291 0.099 0.019  0.411 
Cooking Fuel  0.563  0.091  0.001  -0.048  -0.009  0.776 
Demographic Variables          
Muslim  0.105 0.015  0.604 0.025 0.005  0.846 
Other 0.178  0.025  0.473  -0.072  -0.014  0.651 
HHsize  0.069 0.010  0.035 0.086 0.017  0.000 
Child  0.239 0.035  0.025 0.087 0.017  0.128 
Aged  0.026 0.004  0.813 0.084 0.016  0.225 
Age_head  0.000 0.000  0.971 0.001 0.000  0.841 
Sex_head -0.300  -0.041  0.234  -0.098  -0.019  0.601 
Constant  -0.379  0.397  0.130   0.639 
          
Observations  1866    4737    
Log  Pseudo-likelihood  -857.82    -2670.01    
Note: Standard errors are adjusted for heteroscedasticity.  Marginal effects are evaluated at the mean. 
 




Table A.2: Determinants of Extent of Catastrophic Health Expenditure for Urban and 
Rural Sectors 
(Dependent variable is after logistic transformation) 
 Urban  Rural 
Variable Coefficient  p-value Coefficient p-value 
Economic Variables      
Wealth  Index  -0.066 0.016 -0.043 0.018 
Insurance_head  -0.389 0.028 -0.117 0.564 
Interaction (Wealth & Insurance head)  0.159  0.058  -0.007  0.902 
Primary  -0.044 0.653 -0.148 0.048 
Secondary  -0.183 0.111 -0.194 0.096 
Highschool -0.106  0.423  0.016  0.914 
Health Risk Factors      
Toilet  -0.187 0.033 -0.026 0.856 
Drinking Water  -0.043  0.596  0.005  0.949 
Cooking  Fuel  -0.215 0.032 -0.192 0.099 
Demographic Variables      
Muslim  0.045 0.700 0.131 0.159 
Other -0.160  0.309  0.206  0.044 
HHsize  -0.019 0.301 -0.018 0.216 
Child  0.046 0.374 0.114 0.001 
Aged  0.164 0.005 0.219 0.000 
Age_head 0.003  0.299  -0.005  0.049 
Sex_head 0.214  0.181  -0.149  0.195 
Constant  -2.345 0.000 -1.828 0.000 
      
Observations  1405  3405  
R-squared  0.111  0.051  
Note: Standard errors are adjusted for heteroscedasticity.   
 
 